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Summary
The ongoing intergovernmental conference (IGC) and the preparation of the 
"Financial Perspectives post-2006" i.e. the next multi-annual financial framework of 
the European Union, have led to new discussions on the issue of EU own taxes.
As this issue is also likely to emerge regularly in future debates, it is useful to present 
a structured analysis of some of the pros and cons of giving taxing powers to the 
Union. Such an analysis has already been made in the past, notably in Agenda 2000, 
which presented the European Commission's position concerning the EU financial 
framework for the period 2000-2006. Several possibilities for a "genuine" or tax-
based own resource (“EU tax”) were presented and assessed in Agenda 2000. 
However, that analysis requires revision and updating to take account of the 
considerable evolution of EU objectives and policies in recent years and to include an 
assessment of new possibilities, such as, for instance, a climate charge on aviation 
emissions.
Eight criteria are applied to nine main candidates for EU taxation and comparisons are 
made with regard to these criteria. One of the main conclusions that can be drawn 
from this multi-criteria analysis is that there is no such thing as a perfect tax for the 
EU. All the main candidates that have been suggested for EU taxes have some pros 
and some cons.
The inability of proposed EU taxes to meet fully certain criteria should not lead to the 
conclusion that these taxes should be dismissed, as has sometimes been argued in the 
past. On the contrary, the analysis presented here highlights the fact that the choice 
between one or several EU taxes would critically depend on a political choice as to 
which criteria should be considered essential and which secondary. Furthermore, an 
assessment of a tax as a possible candidate should ultimately have regard to its impact 
on the functioning of the overall financing system of the EU.
Keywords: EU tax, own resource, aviation emission, EU corporate income tax, 
modulated VAT. 
JEL Classification: H21 6
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Tradition has it that any serious discussion on the financial perspectives of the 
European Union (EU) also leads to heated debates on the EU's need to decide on its 
own resources. This is not surprising since the power to raise taxes is often seen as a 
central element of state sovereignty. Neither is it a new issue or one that is specific to 
the European Union. As early as 1787, Alexander Hamilton, one of the founding 
fathers of the USA, strongly advocated the collection at a central level of certain taxes 
in preference to a system limiting central revenues to customs duties and contributions 
by the States of the Union. He described “requisitions upon the States” as having the 
"inevitable tendency […] to enfeeble the Union, and sow the seeds of discord and 
contention between the federal head and its members, and between the members 
themselves" [Hamilton, 1787].
The ongoing intergovernmental conference (IGC) and the preparation of the 
"Financial Perspectives post-2006", i.e. the next multi-annual financial framework of 
the European Union, have led to new discussions on the issue of EU own taxes. As 
this issue is also likely to emerge regularly in future debates, it is useful to present a 
structured analysis of some of the pros and cons of giving taxing powers to the Union. 
Such an exercise has already been made in the past, notably in the context of Agenda 
2000, which presented the European Commission's position concerning the EU 
financial framework for the period 2000-2006 [European Commission, 1998]. Several 
candidates for a genuine or tax-based own resource (“EU tax”) were presented and 
assessed. However, that analysis needs to be revised and updated to take into account 
the considerable evolution of EU objectives and policies in recent years and to include 
an assessment of new possibilities, such as, for instance, a climate charge on aviation 
emissions. The present revision of previous work also provides scope for a deepening 
of the existing analysis and an adaptation of criteria for the evaluation of possible 
candidates.
In what follows, specific assumptions have been made concerning the practical 
aspects of some of the suggestions for an EU tax. These assumptions should not be 
considered as political choices. They rather represent what the author views as the 
most sensible technical options for a future EU tax in the current EU context. The 
‘central scenarios’ presented here do not exclude alternative options. They do 
however provide an idea of the main pros and cons of any possibility.
It should also be clear that a discussion on EU taxation can only provide partial 
information as to the feasibility of a proposed EU financing system. The coherence 
and sustainability of a financing system very much depends on the interaction of its 
constituent parts. Hence, some drawbacks related to specific taxes may well be 
irrelevant in the wider context of a future EU financing system. This Taxation Paper 
does not attempt an overall assessment of either the present or a possible future 
financing system for the Union. Instead, it focuses on the examination of possible 
individual taxes that could be assigned to the European Union. A broader analysis, 
presenting the European Commission's position on the future financing system of the 7
EU, can be found in the recent Communication on the Policy challenges and 
budgetary means of the Enlarged Union for 2007-2013 [European Commission, 
2004].
Lastly, the technical assessment presented here offers only partial and technical 
guidance for decision taking. Designing an EU financing system ultimately depends 
on broader political objectives and the weight placed on specific assessment criteria. 
In other words, this paper does not address the eminently political question of whether 
there should be a new European own resource, but merely analyses possible 
candidates for an EU tax. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section (section II) presents the analytical 
framework used for the assessment of candidates for an EU tax. This framework 
refines the analysis made in Agenda 2000. The third section presents and assesses a 
number of possible candidates for EU taxes with respect to the criteria proposed in the 
second section. The fourth section presents a horizontal analysis for nine possible EU 
taxes. Conclusions are drawn in the fifth section. 
II.   CRITERIA FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF EU TAXES 
This section briefly presents the criteria that could be used to carry out an assessment 
of possible EU taxes. Three main categories of criteria are distinguished. The first 
covers the budgetary criteria. The second category deals with criteria related to 
economic efficiency. The last category examines several equity criteria. 
It is considered here that the technical analysis should not place emphasis on any 
specific criterion. At this stage, many uncertainties remain that call for a cautious and 
balanced approach to the matter, without any predefined view of the ultimate outcome 
of the forthcoming debates on an EU tax. This approach differs somewhat from the 
one followed in Agenda 2000 where a distinction was made between "primary" and 
"secondary" criteria. 
It should also be noted that the analysis places little emphasis on the transition costs 
towards an EU tax. The decision not to deal with these costs was made owing to the 
difficulty of assessing both the economic and the political costs of such a transition. 
Nevertheless these costs could prove a critical argument in adopting or rejecting a 
possible EU tax in the future. 
II.1.  BUDGETARY CRITERIA
Some of the criteria considered important in the analysis made in Agenda 2000 and in 
other studies relate to issues that go beyond the mere question of an EU tax. As will 
be shown below, the sufficiency criterion raises questions as to the mix of resources 
needed to finance the EU budget in the future while the stability criterion relates to the 
issue of financial autonomy for the EU.8
(i)  Sufficiency 
The evaluation of any possible EU tax depends heavily on the tasks of the EU, 
their evolution over time, and the existence (or absence) of other resources for the 
Community. For instance, if an EU tax were to replace the VAT and GNI 
contributions, it would need to be a substantial tax, bringing about revenues 
equivalent to close to 1% of the EU GNP. Furthermore, should the EU budget 
increase over time, one would have to make sure that the EU tax did not rely 
upon a base that tended to decrease over time. These arguments relate to the 
sufficiency criterion. The latter can be stated as follows : 
Criterion N°1 : Sufficiency
Would the revenues of the EU tax be sufficient to cover the expenditures of the 
EU in the long run? 
If the envisaged EU tax does not fulfil this criterion, it could be possible to 
combine several small taxes to obtain sufficient revenues. Alternatively, a 
solution could be found by complementing the EU tax with other resources such 
as direct contributions or grants from the Member States or other own resources 
in line with the current system. In short, the sufficiency criterion has to be placed 
in the broader context of the overall financing of the EU budget, beyond the 
question of an EU tax. 
(ii) Stability 
Taxes can bring about more or less stable revenues across time. For example, 
some tax revenues are very sensitive to the business cycle or to the price of 
commodities. As a consequence, for purely technical reasons EU revenues may 
be insufficient for a given year, while they may exceed the needs in the following 
year. In short, even though the sufficiency criterion might be respected in an 
average year short term variations in the EU tax revenues may prove particularly 
difficult to manage.
Therefore, in the future budgetary framework, the short-run stability of the EU 
tax revenues will have to be taken into account when designing the new 
budgetary framework. This gives rise to the following criterion: 
Criterion N°2 : Stability
Would the EU tax bring about stable revenues to the EU budget? 
If the tax does not fully satisfy this criterion, it may be necessary to complement 
it with other, more stable, resources. Alternatively, more fiscal autonomy of the 
Community could also be accompanied by more financial autonomy, that is, a 
capacity to borrow on (or lend to) the financial markets. This would allow the 
Community to soften the budgetary impact of exogenous revenue shocks. 9
However, this last, politically sensitive, issue falls beyond the scope of this paper 
and is not dealt with further in what follows. 
II.2.  EFFICIENCY CRITERIA
As a general principle, tax competences should be assigned to the level of government 
where they can be managed best and in order to foster an efficient working of the 
economy. In what follows, efficiency is understood as the capacity to achieve a 
specific objective with the smallest possible amount of resources. Three types of 
efficiency arguments are considered in particular. The first one focuses on the 
accountability-enhancing impact of an EU tax and the so-called “visibility” criterion. 
Next, the operating costs of taxation, i.e. the compliance and administrative costs, are 
examined. Lastly, the effect of taxation on the efficient allocation of resources in the 
EU is scrutinised.
(i)  Visibility 
Creating an EU tax may increase transparency of EU financing and thereby foster 
the involvement of the Parliament in budgetary matters. This in turn could have 
positive consequences in terms of efficiency. Indeed, as taxpayers tend to 
question the use and the amount of the taxes they pay, they also force the tax 
authorities to better justify the use of their resources and to make the best use of 
them. Increased transparency may thus impact on the accountability of a 
government and on overall efficiency. 
However, it is probably impossible to measure directly the effect of a tax on 
accountability of a government, as this “best use” of resources is difficult to 
define in practice. Therefore, the accountability impact of a tax reform has to be 
assessed indirectly. In this respect, the “visibility” of a tax is probably an 
acceptable second-best indicator to highlight the effect of a tax on accountability. 
The visibility is understood here as all the factors that increase the awareness of 
the taxpayers to the amount of taxes raised and on the final destination of the 
proceeds of the tax. The visibility criterion can be expressed as follows: 
Criterion N°3 : Visibility
Would the EU tax be visible for the EU citizens? 
(ii) Low operating costs 
An EU tax could have an important impact on the compliance and administrative 
costs of taxation. The increased co-ordination related to an EU tax could in 
particular lead to substantial cost-savings for taxpayers and/or tax administrations 
of Member States. In other cases an EU tax could, on the contrary, be applied in 10
addition to existing taxes and impose a new burden on taxpayers and/or 
administrations.
Operating costs of taxation could particularly decrease in the case of taxes 
characterised by so-called “regional arbitrariness” that are transferred to the EU. 
Regional arbitrariness refers to situation where it is difficult to determine what 
the exact share is of a tax base that should be attributed to one or other Member 
State. In this case complex tax-sharing rules have to be defined, e.g. for corporate 
income taxation, which sometimes prove costly to both taxpayers and tax 
administrations. In these cases, it may be more efficient to assign the tax to the 
‘higher’ level of authority, as is for instance the case for customs duties in the 
EU. These arguments can be summarised as follows: 
Criterion N°4 : Low operating costs
Would the EU tax be simple to administer and involve low compliance costs? 
(iii) Efficient allocation of resources 
Taxes may modify the structure of prices in the economy. This may in turn affect 
the behaviour of economic agents. In some cases, a change of behaviour is 
precisely the objective underlying the creation of the tax. This is, in particular, the 
case where there exist market imperfections or externalities, such as in the 
environment field. In other cases, such a change of behaviour is not desirable and 
it can be a source of economic inefficiency. This is, for instance, the case when 
the tax treatment of a specific investment differs according to its location in the 
Internal Market. The ultimate location of the investment may then be determined 
by tax rather than by productivity concerns. 
Hence, an EU tax may facilitate the efficient allocation of resources on two 
grounds. First, it can potentially provide leverage for Community action and 
foster EU policies in fields where there are cross-border externalities and limited 
co-ordination of tax policies among Member States. Second, it can also lead to a 
harmonisation of some tax bases, with potential benefits for the Internal Market. 
An assessment of an EU tax should take into account these allocation effects. 
These concerns give rise to the following criterion: 
Criterion N°5 : Efficient allocation of resources
Would the EU tax lead to an efficient allocation of resources in the EU? 
II.3.  EQUITY CRITERIA
The design of a tax system can have important implications in terms of equity. This is 
why two commonly used equity criteria, i.e. horizontal and vertical equity, are 
examined in this section. It should be noted that these equity criteria refer to the 
situation of individuals. In addition, a third criterion related to the issue of the overall 11
impact of an EU tax on Member States, the “fair contributions” criterion, is examined. 
This last criterion calls for a discussion on equalisation mechanisms in the EU budget. 
(i) Horizontal equity 
Horizontal equity refers to the principle that “equals should benefit from equal 
treatment”. To make horizontal equity an operational idea, one must define the 
meaning of equals. In particular, should the latter be based on the ability to pay, 
the earning capacity or the pre-tax level of utility of the taxpayers? There is no 
easy answer to these questions. However, when it comes to assessing an EU tax 
proposal, the focus is only placed on the tax having an identical impact in the 
various Member States for a given taxpayer. At European level, this principle has 
an important symbolic value. Unequal tax treatment of equivalent EU taxpayers 
across the EU would probably be considered as discriminatory and against the 
ideals of the European construction. This can be expressed in the following way:
Criterion N°7 : Horizontal equity
Would the EU tax have an equal impact on equivalent taxpayers across the EU? 
It should be noted that this criterion would automatically be respected for taxes 
with a common tax base and rate across the EU. 
(ii)  Vertical equity 
The vertical equity criterion focuses on distribution of income among citizens. It 
is often argued that redistribution policies are a matter for the Member States, 
according to the subsidiarity principle. Member States are better aware of the 
needs of the citizens and of the appropriate amount of redistribution needed on 
their territory. However, as it is likely that an EU tax would have some impact on 
income redistribution, it is necessary to provide a guideline for the assessment of 
EU taxes in this respect.
It is often suggested in the theory of fiscal federalism that taxes with a 
distribution feature should be attributed to the most centralised level of 
government. This is so because when taxpayers are mobile across tax 
jurisdictions the well-off tend to move towards low tax jurisdictions while poorer 
taxpayers tend to concentrate in jurisdictions favouring income redistribution 
(and higher taxes). As a consequence, the redistribution mechanisms may not be 
sustainable in the long run. Furthermore, acceptance of an EU tax for the 
European citizens would probably require it to involve some degree of income 
redistribution. These concerns can be expressed in the following way: 
Criterion N°6 : Vertical equity
Would the EU tax involve income redistribution? 12
(iii) Fair contributions 
Financing the EU budget through Member States' contributions is quite different 
to financing it through an EU tax. Taxes are not contributions. And taxpayers are 
not Member States. However, considering the sensitivity of the issue of 
contributions to the EU budget in most Member States, an assessment of possible 
EU taxes with regard to this criterion seems useful. The idea here is to consider 
the amount of the EU tax collected in a given Member State as its (indirect) 
"contribution" to the EU budget.
In what follows it is considered that a tax that would bring revenues from a 
Member State in line with the Member States’ economic development would 
probably be easiest to accept. This would be consistent with the increasing 
reliance on the GNI contribution in the EU budget. This gives rise to the 
following criterion: 
Criterion N°8 : Fair contributions
Would the EU tax raise revenues in the Member States in line with their 
economic development? 
If the tax does not fully satisfy this criterion, a possibility would be to develop an 
equalisation mechanism to redistribute revenues across Member States. Such a 
mechanism could take into account the overall contributions of the Member 
States to the EU tax, as well as the variables linked to their economic 
development and their needs. However, this issue of equalisation or a 
"correction" mechanism goes beyond the scope of this paper and is therefore not 
dealt with in what follows. 
BOX1:E IGHT CRITERIA FOR AN EU TAX
The assessment of the possible EU taxes is made with regard to the following eight 
criteria.
Criterion N°1 : Sufficiency
Would the revenues of the EU tax be sufficient to cover the expenditures of the EU in 
the long run? 
Criterion N°2 : Stability
Would the EU tax bring about stable revenues for the EU budget? 
Criterion N°3 : Visibility
Would the EU tax be visible to the EU citizens? 
Criterion N°4 : Low operating costs
Would the EU tax be simple to administer and involve  low compliance costs? 
Criterion N°5 : Efficient allocation of resources
Would the EU tax lead to an efficient allocation of resources in the EU? 13
Criterion N°6 : Vertical equity
Would the EU tax involve income redistribution? 
Criterion N°7 : Horizontal equity
Would the EU tax have an equal impact on equivalent taxpayers across the EU? 
Criterion N°8 : Fair contributions
Would the EU tax raise revenues from the Member States in line with their economic 
strength?
III.   POSSIBLE EU TAXES 
This third section presents a systematic assessment of nine possible EU taxes with 
regard to the eight criteria defined above. This assessment relies heavily on a number 
of assumptions. In most cases, the proposals found in the literature are rather 
imprecise, which makes their assessment difficult in practice. By entering into some 
details, one can then better underline possible issues -and sometimes solutions- related 
to possible EU taxes.
In any event, it is important to underline that the assumptions made below are 
"working" assumptions and do not reflect in any way a political decision taken by the 
European Commission. However, when several options were equally feasible from a 
technical point of view for a given candidate, preference has been given to the one 
that the author considered most realistic in the current EU political context.
In order to highlight the main merits and drawbacks of each possibility and facilitate 
comparisons, stars (*) are used. Their interpretation can be found in Box 2 below. 
BOX2:I NTERPRETING THE ASSESSMENT
The assessment of possible EU taxes is based on the answer to questions (see the 
criteria above). They are summarised using stars (*). These should be interpreted as 
follows:
*** The answer to the question is clearly positive. Important positive arguments 
outweigh negative ones. The tax thus satisfies the relevant criterion to a high degree. 
** The answer to the question is ambiguous. There are both positive and negative 
arguments to take into account or a lack of any convincing information to take 
position. Two stars thus represent a balanced situation, where the criterion is only 
partially achieved. 
* The answer to the question is undoubtedly negative. Negative arguments clearly 
outweigh positive ones. The tax is thus unlikely to fully achieve the criterion. 14
III.1. MODULATED VAT
The proposal for a modulated VAT has been advocated by the European Parliament 
(1994). The Langes Report stated in particular that “a proportion of a largely 
harmonised VAT, imposed on the basis of tax declarations and clearly denoted on 
each individual invoice as EU taxation would at present be the most convincing form 
of own revenue”. The main features of this proposal are presented below, considering 
the broad political support and the legitimacy of this proposal. 
In practice, the Langes Report suggested using a harmonised VAT base. The amount 
of the EU tax would be clearly differentiated from the amount levied for the national 
VAT on the invoices. Both national parliaments and the EU would be granted the 
power to determine separately which rate would be imposed for purposes of the 
national budget and which for the EU budget, respectively. There would be a 
combined VAT rate consisting of the national and the EU rate. For the EU rate, a 
figure of 2% was suggested as a starting point but the figure could then be increased if 
the commitments of the EU were extended. To contribute to equity across individuals 
within the Member States, the report also proposed that there would be two VAT 
rates, e.g. at 1.5% for the basic necessities and 3.0% for all other goods and services. 
The total, combined, tax rate should not increase following the introduction of EU 
rates as the "national" tax rates could be decreased correspondingly by Member 
States. This would be possible because national (VAT and GNI) contributions to the 
EU budget would be significantly reduced, or even eliminated. 
Three main issues should be taken into account when designing a genuine EU VAT. 
Each will require delicate political discussions. 
− First, some Member States have zero-rated goods. Where national administrations 
apply a zero rate, it is difficult to apply any EU surcharge to be compensated for 
by an equivalent reduction in the national rate. Indeed, the rate in these cases 
would have to remain zero and, therefore, corresponding revenues would be nil. 
However, not applying an EU surcharge at all to these goods would lead to 
important national differences, while applying only the EU rate to these zero-rated 
goods would lead to considerable administrative and political problems. 
Developing a workable EU VAT system would therefore most likely require the 
elimination of systems of zero-rated goods. This would entail that in some 
Member States, whole economic sectors move from de facto exemption to 
taxation. As an alternative, zero-rated goods could be kept but this would be taken 
into account in the design of a compensation mechanism. 
− Second, besides the elimination of the system of zero-rated goods, further progress 
might be required as to the harmonisation of VAT bases. Nowadays, the VAT 
base is largely harmonised across the EU. But there still remain differences, 
mainly due to limitations to the right to deduct VAT. Other differences due, for 
instance, to exemption for small firms or flat-rate farmers have a minor impact on 
VAT receipts. However, considering the already large degree of harmonisation of 
tax bases, the possibility of creating a genuine EU VAT should not be excluded, 15
even in the absence of full base harmonisation in a first stage. There again, some 
limited compensations can be envisaged in the design of the overall own resource 
system.
− The last main difference between Member States VAT systems relates to the 
impact of black economy on VAT revenues. Some studies, such as Parsche et al. 
(1996), highlight that differences between Member States could be significant in 
this respect. This may raise concerns that the amount of tax collected in some 
Member States would not reflect their true ability to pay. There is no obvious 
solution to that specific issue. Better enforcement of tax regulations is certainly 
required.
It should be noted that whereas the technical preparation required for the 
implementation of an EU VAT would not be particularly complex, some of the above-
mentioned issues are very sensitive from a political point of view. In particular, the 
treatment of zero-rated goods in some Member States or the elimination of a list of 
exemptions do not imply lengthy technical preparation. However, past discussions 
have highlighted the virtual impossibility of achieving unanimous decisions for VAT 
issues involving the level or scope of rates. 
Criterion Assessment of the Modulated VAT  Rating
Sufficiency VAT is a buoyant source of revenue representing on average 7.0% of 
GDP in Member States in 2001 (European Commission, 2003). 
Applying a surcharge of 2% to the existing VAT base (including on 
zero-rated goods) would bring about revenues equivalent to between 
0.8% and 1.3% of Member States GDP, as compared to a EU budget 
close to 1% of EU GDP. Moreover, tax receipts grow in line with 
increased spending on goods and services without any change in the 
VAT rate(s). Furthermore, in the long run, if resources need to be 
increased, this is achievable through an increase in the VAT rate(s).
***
Stability Private consumption, which would be the principal component of the 
VAT base, has cyclical characteristics. OECD (2000) shows that the 
elasticity of indirect tax revenues to the GDP is close to one in most EU 
countries, with a minimum of 0.5 in Ireland and a maximum of 1.6 in 
Denmark. However, it is unlikely that the replacement of the third and 
(possibly) fourth resources with a VAT resource of the type proposed 
would introduce additional short-run variability in EU budget revenues. 
Indeed, the current third resource is closely related to VAT, while a 
consumption-based tax (the EU VAT) should be more stable than a 
GDP-based contribution (the GNI resource). This is so because the 
most volatile and cyclical components in GDP are investments and 
trade, while consumption and government spending are more stable. 
This also corresponds to the permanent income hypothesis with 
consumption smoothing over time. Overall, VAT could be a fairly 
stable source of revenue.
***
Visibility In the form of two separate tax rates, a national and an EU one, the tax 
will undoubtedly be highly visible to taxpayers/citizens and is certain to 




Adding supplementary rates to the existing VAT system would not 





The impact of modulated VAT on the allocation of resources in the EU 
would probably be limited. This is due to the fact that the EU rates 
would be low, i.e. 1.5-3%, and apply to a broad tax base. 
**
Horizontal equity Provided a full harmonisation of the base is achieved and the issue of 
zero-rated goods is addressed, there will be an equal treatment of 
equivalent taxpayers in the EU. 
***
Vertical equity  In general, VAT is regressive, since poorer people tend to consume a 
larger proportion of their total income. The proposal for a two-rate 
structure offers a partial solution to this problem, by setting lower rates 
on essential goods.
**
Fair contributions  The EP (1997) has examined in depth the Member States’ VAT 
contributions to the budget. From this study, it appears that ‘VAT 
payments are influenced by many factors giving rise to inequities 
between Member States’, e.g. the ratio of private consumption 
spending to GNP, the ratio of public to private consumption spending 
and the net trade balance for manufactured goods. More recent 
estimates, based on the so-called "intermediate" base used for 
calculating VAT contributions to the EU budget, show that the EU 
VAT collected in the Member States would be relatively similar 
(between 0.8 and 1.3% of GDP). Given the possibility of inequities in 
gross "contributions" resulting from a modulated VAT, the Langes 
report (1994) favoured an equalisation mechanism based on GNP, next 




As main positive arguments, the Modulated VAT would bring sufficient revenues 
to the EU budget. It would be highly visible to the citizens and present horizontal 
equity. It would also be based on a tax that is already used in the EU financing. In 
practice, the new system would thus mainly modify practical arrangements related 
to the third resource and maybe fourth resource. 
In general, there would not be major efficiency or equity arguments against this 
proposal.
However, some institutional aspects would have to be further examined. In 
particular, the VAT raised could vary from one Member State to the next, thereby 
requiring some kind of equalisation mechanism. Furthermore, some adjustments to 
Member States' VAT systems would probably be required, in particular the 
elimination of the system of zero-rated goods and further harmonisation of the 
VAT base. This could cause serious political difficulties. 
III.2. EU CORPORATE INCOME TAX
Using corporate income as tax base for a new own resource has been examined on 
several occasions. Agenda 2000 refers in particular to a report by the European 
Parliament (1990) and to a thorough review of the issues involved in Albi et al. 
(1997).
However, little is said in Agenda 2000 about what concrete form a corporate income 
tax at EU level would take. For that reason some information on policy developments 17
in the tax or related areas in recent years is set out below in order to arrive at a 
definition of the main features of a possible EU corporate income tax.
− First, the European Company statute was adopted in 2001. In concrete terms this 
means that companies that have activities in several Member States are now able 
to utilise a specific legal statute at the European level. However, there are not yet 
any appropriate tax provisions in relation to this statute and this makes reflection 
on European corporate taxation particularly relevant.
− Second, the Communication on Tax Policy of May 2001 [COM(2001)260] in the 
European Union highlighted the importance of paying attention to the concerns of  
businesses and citizens in the Internal Market. In particular, it underlined the fact 
that businesses in the EU have to cope with up to 15 (soon 25) national tax 
systems while operating in the Internal Market. This leads to substantial 
compliance costs. In addition, the incompatibility of national tax systems 
sometimes makes it difficult to invest or to perform activities in other Member 
States. Therefore, there appears to be solid justification for approximating, if not 
harmonising, Member States corporate income tax bases. 
− Last, the Communication on Company Taxation of October 2001 
[COM(2001)582] and the associated study on Company Taxation in the Internal 
Market prepared by the Commission Services [SEC(2001)1681], as well as the 
follow-up Communication on Company Taxation of November 2003 
[COM(2003)726], highlight the limitations inherent in a piecemeal approach to 
eliminating tax obstacles to the proper functioning of the Internal Market. These 
publications demonstrate how a comprehensive approach to corporate income 
taxation in the long term could eliminate current tax obstacles. Among the 
comprehensive approaches mentioned by the Commission, one is particularly 
relevant in the context of a systematic assessment of candidates as "genuine own 
resources", namely the EU corporate income tax (EUCIT). However, the 
Commission in the above documents expressed its preference for other 
approaches, on the basis that they would be likely to find more support from 
economic operators and Member States. 
Developing a European Union corporate income tax (EUCIT) would require first a 
definition of a common (consolidated) tax base. This base would be applied in a 
compulsory manner to all companies liable to corporation tax or to a precisely defined 
group of companies subject to this tax, e.g. those listed on a stock exchange or 
multinational companies with above a given turnover threshold or European 
Companies. For the companies concerned the EU tax would have to replace the 
existing national corporate taxes. The applicable tax rate would need to be defined at 
EU level. Autonomous national surcharges could in theory be envisaged, but they 
would lead to significant administrative costs and political difficulties linked to the 
necessity of sharing the tax base (via "formulary apportionment") between the 
Member States.
The political difficulties of securing the agreement of Member States to a 
comprehensive approach such as the EUCIT should not be underestimated as all 18
previous proposals involving a substantial approximation of the corporate tax base 
have met with strong opposition in the Council. Furthermore, whereas comprehensive 
options on a voluntary basis are usually supported by the business community in the 
context of harmonising the tax base, a compulsory scheme at EU level, possibly 
implying higher tax rates, would be likely to face significant opposition from 
economic operators. Last, current discussions in the Council have also raised the 
question of whether a subgroup of Member States could develop a common tax base 
in order to reduce compliance costs and increase the competitiveness of their 
companies. The possible adoption of so-called "enhanced cooperation" in this respect 
would presumably not be made with the objective of the subsequent creation of a 
EUCIT.
Criterion Assessment of the EU corporate income tax  Rating
Sufficiency The tax base of the EU corporate income tax would be relatively 
limited and unpredictable. Although the corporate income tax 
represents on average 2.6% of GDP in the EU in 2001 (see European 
Commission, 2003), depending on the design of the scheme only a 
limited number of companies would be concerned by the EU corporate 
income tax. But these account for only a part of total value added and 
taxes. For instance, a recent study highlights that the share of foreign 
controlled multinational companies in total value added represented 
between 11.7% and 17.9% for five EU countries in 1997 (Eurostat, 
2001). In these circumstances, the EU corporate income tax could not 
be used as the main or only resource of the EU. It would probably need 
to be complemented by other resources.
**
Stability Corporate profits have pronounced cyclical characteristics. However, 
estimates of output elasticity of the corporate income tax differ widely 
depending on the methodology used. The OECD (2000) for instance 
finds an elasticity of the tax to GDP of 1.3 for a sample of 20 OECD 
countries. For the same countries Giorno et al. (1995) found an average 
elasticity of 2.7. The replacement of the third and fourth resources with 
a resource of the type proposed would thus significantly raise the short-
run variability of EU budget revenues. 
*
Visibility Although the corporate tax would only affect directly those citizens 
who are owners of firms, the level of corporate taxation traditionally 
receives substantial attention in the political debates. As a result, 
depending on who was responsible for setting the EU tax rate, there 
could be an element of increased EU accountability if the 
citizens/voters were able to influence the level of taxation. This would 
in particular be the case in a scenario where the EU would be solely 




The obligation to deal with up to 15 (soon 25) tax systems and 
administrations is very cumbersome. Indeed, currently, any cross-
border operation has to be monitored by at least two tax 
administrations. Market operators often complain about this. In the 
European corporate income tax system, the company would fill in only 
one tax form for all intra-Community transactions. This could lead to 
substantial savings in compliance costs for companies operating in the 
EU. The implementation of this tax could also lead to lower total 
administrative costs, since only one tax return would have to be 
prepared for participating companies. However, this positive view 
could be mitigated by the many practical difficulties that 
administrations would face when coping with the EU tax system 
parallel to the national system (should the EU tax be only applicable to 





A European corporate income tax could help eliminating tax obstacles 
to cross-border activities, thereby fostering a proper functioning of the 
Internal Market and lower compliance costs for economic operators 
[COM(2001)582]. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions would be 
easier. As a consequence, reorganisation of business activities and 
investments would be fostered. Furthermore, ceteris paribus,
investment is located where it brings the highest after tax return. In 
other words, the current functioning of corporate income taxes is a 
source of distortions in the allocation of capital in the Internal Market. 
Harmonising the corporate income tax in the EU for multinational 
companies would allow for investments locations more in line with 
productivity. This would then improve efficiency in the EU.
***
Horizontal equity Companies subject to the EU corporate income tax would face a 
common (compulsory) set of rules. Horizontal equity would thus be 
fully respected.
***
Vertical equity  The burden of corporate income taxation can fall on consumers, owners 
of the company capital or wage earners, depending on the context. It is 
therefore difficult to make a clear assessment of the effect of corporate 
income taxation on income distribution in the EU. However, CIT is 
often viewed as a withholding tax on dividends and thus on private 
capital owners, who can be assumed to be on the upper end of the 
income distribution. But this is not always true. For instance, most 
shares in UK listed companies are owned by pension funds which 
provide pensions for both low paid and high paid persons. 
**
Fair contributions  The differing corporate income tax revenues observed in the EU 
nowadays (between 0.6 and 7.7% of GDP in 2001) result from highly 
differing tax systems. Furthermore, the economic structures, in 
particular the openness of the economy and the proportion of 
multinational companies could play an important role in the geographic 
impact of the EU tax. Amounts collected in the Member States could 
thus not fully reflect their economic development. At the same time, it 
has to be recognized that corporate income taxation is marked by a 
certain degree of "regional arbitrariness". This tax involves a mismatch 
between the geographical pattern of tax collection and tax burden, 
which makes any national reapportioning arbitrary. In this context, fair 




EU corporate income tax could offer significant benefits in terms of efficiency in 
the Internal Market. It could facilitate cross-border activities in the EU and make 
investments more efficient. 
On the other hand, there would be numerous technical difficulties, in particular if 
the new tax was defined for a specific group of market operators only. 
Furthermore, creating an EU corporate income tax would also require the 
development of – and unanimous agreement on – a harmonised corporate tax base.
III.3. ENERGY TAXATION
In the past decade, the Commission has put forward several proposals for directives in 
the field of CO2 or energy taxation in order to facilitate the functioning of the Internal 
Market and to develop a more environmental- and employment-friendly taxation 
policy in the EU. The first of these proposals was the Commission’s 1992 
carbon/energy tax proposal. It envisaged a levy which was to start at $3 a barrel of oil 
equivalent in 1993 rising to $10 a barrel in 2000. It met considerable opposition in the 
Council. Therefore, subsequent proposals have had to be less ambitious. 
The most recent proposal [COM(1997)30 final] mainly extends the scope of the 
existing directive on mineral oils to a number of other energy sources, e.g. coal, 
electricity and natural gas. It also increases the Community minimum excise duties on 
energy products. Discussions finally resulted in a unanimous political agreement of 
Finance Ministers on 20 March 2003 and the directive entered into force on 1 January 
2004. Under this new directive, most energy products are subject to Community 
taxation. The directive entails the harmonisation of the tax base on mineral oils, 
natural gas, electricity and coal, and the approximation of tax levels through 
Community-wide minimum rates of taxation.
Although it is clear “that the [Commission] proposals [in the field of energy taxation] 
have not been prepared with the view to facilitating the establishment of new own 
resources” (Agenda 2000), energy tax has been considered a potential candidate as 
EU tax on several occasions. In the absence of a clear indication on the form of an EU 
energy tax in previous work on the matter, a number of assumptions have to be made 
as to what an EU energy tax could look like.
Considering the content of the energy directive, two main possibilities can be 
envisaged: a broad-based energy tax and an energy tax on motor fuel used for 
transport.
− In the first option, the tax base would encompass all the energy sources 
covered by the directive, including mineral oils, electricity, coal and natural 
gas. A differentiation of excise duties according to the use or quality of the 
product as well as exemptions and tax refunds would be foreseen in a number 
of circumstances as laid down in the new directive. This could for example be 
the case for energy-intensive companies, where competitiveness issues with 
third countries are very sensitive. The tax would be raised when the taxable 21
products are delivered to consumption and not at the level of the final 
consumer, in order to simplify the tax collection.
− In the second option, the tax base would only include motor fuel used for 
transport, that is, a part only of energy sources covered by the directive. Motor 
fuel used for transport includes leaded and unleaded petrol, diesel, kerosene, 
LPG and natural gas used for transport. Energy products used as a motor fuel 
for certain industrial and commercial purposes and those used as heating fuel 
would thus not be taxed at EU level. Furthermore, products used for air and 
maritime transport would also be subject to a specific treatment, in line with 
the directive. From a technical point of view, it should be noted that most 
possibilities of tax differentiation allowed by the energy directive apply to 
heating fuels and electricity, and to some very specific uses of motor fuel (see 
Article 8 of the directive). These may prove difficult to manage and make the 
broad-based energy tax less attractive than this second option. 
In both these options, the EU tax rates (that is the rates used for the own resource 
revenue collection) could be set at levels equivalent to the minimum rates defined in 
the directive or at different rates, depending on budgetary needs and other objectives 
attached to the EU tax.
The question of whether Member States should be able to set additional tax rates (or 
surcharges) on top of the EU tax rates remains open. The answer depends notably on 
budgetary needs and other objectives attached to the EU tax. For instance, surcharges 
may not be desirable for commercial diesel fuel, non-commercial diesel and unleaded 
petrol if one wishes to achieve a high degree of harmonisation in these areas. Such an 
approach would be consistent with the Commission proposal of July 2002 concerning 
the harmonisation of commercial diesel fuel and the objectives laid out in the 
Commission's White Paper on European transport policy for 2010 [European 
Commission, 2001]. On the other hand, allowing Member States surcharges could 
facilitate the acceptability of proposals. It would also allow for national 
differentiations according to specific national priorities and policies.
The assessment of both options is substantially similar. The table below highlights 
differences where necessary. 22
Criterion Assessment of the EU Energy Tax  Rating
Sufficiency Taxes on energy represented 2.0% of GDP in 2001, while taxes on 
mineral oil accounted for 1.8% of EU GDP (EC and Eurostat 2003). A 
large part of mineral oils tax revenues relates to fuel used for transport. 
An EU energy tax, even it was limited to setting the EU tax rates at the 
level defined for the minimum rates in the directive, would probably 
bring sufficient revenue to cover a significant part of the EU budget. 
This is in line with previous Commission conclusions. For instance, in 
European Commission (1993) it was estimated that a USD10 tax per 
barrel of oil equivalent would yield about 1.1% of EU GNP in the 
context of a carbon/energy tax. In the longer run, the tax would also be 
sufficient: according to the European Parliament (1997), energy use 
correlates quite closely with GDP growth. Eurostat (2000) also shows 
that over the last 20 years, energy taxes have grown as a percentage of 
total taxes and as a percentage of GDP (from 1.62% in 1980 to 2.21% 
in 1997). 
***
Stability Being a tax based on quantities sold and not ad valorem, the energy tax 
would be relatively insensitive to the price of energy on the 
international markets because of the low price elasticity of demand. 
Past data shows that energy taxes revenues tend to be relatively stable 
(European Commission, 2003). The main changes (in % of GDP) have 
been observed in 1986 a year of sharp drop in oil prices (-0.15%) and in 
1990-1992 a period of turbulences due the Kuweit crisis (+0.22%). In 
general, downward variations have been rather limited. Furthermore, as 
fuel prices only constitute a fraction of total transport costs (23%), the 
effects of a higher oil price would be correspondingly small on 
transport activities. Some simulations show that in the oil price hike in 
2001, which translated into rocketing net fuel prices (+86%), total 
transport costs increased by less than 7%, triggering a reduction in 
transport demand and fuel consumption of 2-3% only.
***
Visibility Public opinion is very sensitive to energy and pollution issues. It is 





Energy taxation in the form of excise duties on a limited number of 
products, especially on motor fuels used for transport, would be 





Provided the design of the EU energy tax leads to some harmonisation 
in the tax rates for energy products, it can foster an efficient allocation 
of resources in the EU. In particular, increased harmonisation for fuel 
products used by professional transporters can lead to better allocation 
of transport activities in the EU and reduced pollution. Taxation of 
energy products may also potentially contribute to achieving EU 
environmental objectives as regards polluting emissions. In particular, 
it could help Member States in their efforts to comply with the 
obligations stated in the Kyoto Protocol. 
***
Horizontal equity The harmonisation of the EU energy tax base makes it possible to apply 
an equal treatment to taxpayers in the EU.
***23
Vertical equity  When it comes to heating products the burden of energy taxation falls 
proportionately more on poorer households. For other energy products, 
such as gasoline used for transport, the burden of the tax falls more 
heavily on well-off people. Therefore, whether energy taxes involve 
income redistribution has to be examined on a product by product 
basis. Overall the assessment of the two options presented above may 
differ on this specific issue of vertical equity. 
**(*)
Fair contributions  The level of energy tax revenues differs significantly across the 
Member States. Energy taxes represent 1.2% of GDP in Ireland 
compared with up to 2.7% of GDP in Denmark in 2001 and 2.8 % in 
Luxemburg (see European Commission, 2003). This is due to different 
climate conditions, economic circumstances, available natural resource 
and political choices. However, this does not constitute a serious 
indication of potential unfair contribution, should the rates be 




A European Energy tax, for instance focusing on motor fuels used for transport, 
could permit an efficient allocation of resources in the EU. It would also bring 
substantial revenues for the EU budget.
Relatively easy to design and implement, it would nevertheless also have a number 
of drawbacks. Under the broad base option in particular there could be vertical 
equity problems.
III.4. EXCISE DUTIES ON TOBACCO AND ALCOHOL
In the EU, excise duties apply to a narrow group of goods, most notably tobacco, 
alcohol and mineral oils. Presently, several directives govern excise rates and 
structures in the EU. They define minimum excise rates for each product type and 
determine the product types subject to excise levies. They also explain the method of 
implementing the duties as well as the criteria for exemptions or preferential treatment 
as the case may be. As a result, extended base harmonisation has been achieved in 
some areas. However exemptions continue to be numerous. Furthermore since the 
level of the minimum rates is very low, i.e. sometimes the minimum rate is set at zero, 
there are significant differences between the rates applied among Member States. For 
example, for sparkling wines, the minimum excise duty is set at zero euro per 
hectolitre, with duties varying between €546.01 in Ireland and zero in producing 
countries such as France or Italy. Modifications of the existing directives have been 
proposed on occasions, notably to improve the unrestricted mobility of goods subject 
to excise duties in the Internal Market, to fight against tax evasion (smuggling), or to 
achieve environmental or other EU objectives, e.g. related to health.
The idea of using excise duties on these goods as EU tax has been examined in the 
European Parliament report (1994) and in the Agenda 2000. Although tobacco and 
alcohol excise duties, in particular, are regarded as important instruments of national 
social and health policy, it is conceivable that part of their yield could be assigned to 
the EU level. Contrary to these previous reports, which also took mineral oils into 
consideration, mineral oil is not examined here since it is analysed in the previous 
section. However, it is perfectly conceivable to mix various scenarios.24
In order to assess EU excise duties with regard to the criteria presented in section II, 
the following assumptions are made. Firstly, the EU would levy a minimum rate on a 
harmonised tax base. This could imply removing existing exemptions and 
derogations. The Member States would be free to levy additional rates or not on all or 
part of this base. Lastly, the EU duties would be raised by national tax administrations 
and paid over to the EU. 
Criterion Assessment of the EU excise duties  Rating
Sufficiency Excise duties are estimated to be as high as €63bn in 2001 for tobacco 
(0.73% of EU GDP) and €27.2bn for alcohol (0.31% of GDP) 
(European Commission, 2003). Although the EU excise duties would 
probably not be as high as the existing duties, revenues raised could be 
substantial. However, as the European Parliament (1997) points out, 
revenues raised on alcohol and tobacco do not increase in line with 
GNP ‘because taxes are usually defined in terms of quantities rather 
than values’. This problem could, however, be mitigated by the fact 
that revenue elasticities are high in relation to rate increases because the 
demand for such goods is typically price inelastic. Lower revenues 
could then be easily compensated by higher duties.
**
Stability Low elasticities with respect to GNP and low price elasticities of these 
goods would imply stable tax revenues. There is thus a limited risk of 
experiencing marked changes in the revenues raised over the business 
cycle.
***
Visibility Provided the EU tax is clearly indicated on the bills, it will be visible to 
the citizens. However, the excise duties will bear on a narrow range of 
products and affect part of the population only, i.e. smokers and 




Some limited costs could arise from the obligation, for taxpayers or tax 
administrations, to indicate the amount of excise duties paid to the EU 
on tobacco or alcohol products. On the other hand, if the minimum EU-
wide excise duties lead to a reduction in the difference of total excise 
duties between Member States, it may lead to a reduction in fraud 
(smuggling) cases as these are directly linked to after-tax differences of 





Overall, EU-wide minimum rates of excise duties for all alcohol and 
tobacco products may lead to more uniformity in total excise duties 
levied on these products than is currently the case. This could limit 
distortions in the choices of (cross-border) consumption for these 
products. Nevertheless, this approximation of after-tax prices may be 
limited as national governments will still apply different supplementary 
rates on these goods. 
**
Horizontal equity The EU excise duty would be applied in a uniform fashion all across 
the EU. Equal treatment would thus be applied to equivalent 
consumers.
***
Vertical equity  Excise duties on alcohol and tobacco are regressive. Applying EU 
excise duties on these goods would not facilitate income redistribution 
at the EU level. 
*25
Fair contributions  The share of the bases of the excises in GNP differs substantially across 
the Member States. This is largely the result of social/cultural and 
economic differences. For instance, consumption per capita for tobacco 
and alcohol products tends to be highest in producing countries. This 




The main advantage of European excise duties on tobacco and alcohol relates to the 
fact that the tax base is already largely harmonised. In theory, it could therefore be 
relatively quick and easy to impose minimum EU excise duties on these goods. 
The main drawback of the proposal is linked to the unequal sharing of the tax base 
across Member States, which would probably require some equalisation 
mechanism. Furthermore, excise duties on alcohol and tobacco also raise important 
redistribution issues. 
The analysis also underlines that the modalities of implementation of the tax can 
affect its assessment. For instance, there is a trade-off between more visibility 
given to the tax and the compliance costs for the taxpayers.
III.5. TRANSFER OF SEIGNIORAGE REVENUE
While the term seigniorage (or "inflation tax") is often used in the economic literature, 
there is no clear-cut definition of this concept. In general, one can say that seigniorage 
derives from the central bank’s monopoly position as note issuer constituting legal 
tender, the liabilities of which are not remunerated or, in the case of compulsory 
reserves, are sometimes remunerated at below-market interest rates. These liabilities 
constitute the monetary base, the counterpart of which (holdings of government bonds 
and of other assets) yields interest or revenues at market rates. The idea of a transfer 
of seigniorage revenue from central banks to the EU budget has mainly been raised in 
relation to the development of the single currency. Since all countries belonging to a 
monetary union share the same currency and banknotes and coins freely flow from 
one country to another (and also outside the monetary union), the revenues stemming 
from these banknotes and coins are difficult to allocate on a purely national basis, i.e. 
there is a problem of "regional arbitrariness". Furthermore, seigniorage in a monetary 
union can also be considered a common good of the countries taking part in the union. 
Under this logic, a possible transfer of part of seigniorage income to the EU budget 
could be justified, thereby avoiding a national reapportioning.
In the context of a transfer of seigniorage revenue, one should distinguish between the 
"monetary income", or seigniorage as such, and the profits of National Central Banks 
(NCBs). In the EU the term “monetary income” has been established in the statute of 
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the European Central Bank 
(ECB). In article 32 of this statute the monetary income is defined as "the income 
accruing to the National Central Banks in the performance of the ESCB's monetary 
policy function". In practice, it is "equal to the annual income derived from the assets 
held against the notes in circulation and deposit liabilities to credit institutions". 
Central Bank profits differ largely from seigniorage. First, the profit is the result of a 
difference between revenues and costs, while the seigniorage is by definition an 
income. Second, the revenue of Central Banks usually includes various sources of 
revenues, beyond seigniorage. Other revenues result, for instance, from investments 26
of Central Banks' own funds (in particular capital and reserves), monetary policy 
operations, remunerated tasks related to the payment system and to the banking 
sector, etc.
Before turning to the systematic assessment of a transfer of seigniorage revenue to the 
EU budget, some problems need to be discussed. First, this transfer could have a 
significant and variable impact on Central Banks balances. Seigniorage constitutes a 
relatively stable component of Central Bank profits. However, other profit elements 
are much less stable and can even turn out strongly negative. For example, exchange 
rate movements affect the value of bond portfolios and contribute to the volatility of 
Central Banks profits. In addition, NCBs tend to have very different cost and income 
structures. Therefore, a transfer of seigniorage revenue could have a profound impact 
on EU NCBs, particularly if a significant part of seigniorage was transferred to the EU 
budget. This issue could be solved only by adapting the Central Banks transfer to their 
contributive capacity, which would then lead to significantly different contributions, 
or by making considerable adjustments in the revenues and costs structures of Central 
Banks, which may cause important practical and political problems. Second, from a 
political perspective, the taxation of the Eurosystems' monetary income could be seen 
as a signal of a loss of independence. However, it should be noted that in the current 
system Central Banks already transfer part of their profits to national treasuries in the 
form of dividend or tax payments. These issues would need to be addressed prior to 
introducing a transfer of seigniorage revenue. Lastly, it is assumed in what follows 
that an equivalent treatment would be applied to the Central Banks of Member States 
outside the euro area. 
Criterion Assessment of transfer of seigniorage revenue to the EU  Rating
Sufficiency Estimated seigniorage amounted to approximately €10 bn for the 
Eurosystem in 2001. It should be noted that this estimate very much 
depends on the underlying assumptions and accounting rules. As a 
comparison, the aggregate profit of the Eurosystem could be broadly 
estimated at €25 bn in the same year. This amount corresponds to the 
total net income collected by the system, after deduction of all costs, 
but before taxes and dividend payments.
*
Stability In theory the revenues arising from seigniorage can be relatively 
unstable in the short-run since they depend on the demand for cash 
balances and interest rates, which are notably affected by the business 
cycle. However, in the EU context, these variables are relatively stable. 
In the long run, the evolution of seigniorage is uncertain. On the one 
hand, changes in payments habits and the generalised use of electronic 
means of payment might erode the tax base. On the other hand, the 
development of the Euro as an international currency may contribute to 
seigniorage through increased circulation of euro banknotes outside the 
euro area. 
**
Visibility As an implicit tax, seigniorage is not visible to most citizens. *
Low operating 
costs
Compliance and administration costs would be very small, since there 
would be only a few “taxpayers”, i.e. the National Central Banks, and 
the tax base would be easy to define. Furthermore, fraud should be non-





In principle, a transfer of seigniorage revenue to the EU budget can be 
organised in an efficient way.
***
Horizontal equity The tax base would be harmonised, and defined in relation to the 
monetary income of the Central Banks in the EU. Specific rules would 
need to be devised for Central Banks not forming part of the 
Eurosystem, i.e. outside the euro area, in order to ensure equivalent 
treatment.
***
Vertical equity  In principle, a transfer of seigniorage would have no or fairly limited 
direct impact on income redistribution in the EU. This is so because a 
large part of revenue accruing from seigniorage would be transferred 
from national budgets to the EU budget, this transfer being 
compensated by a reduction in direct national contributions to the EU. 
Considering the independence of NCBs in the EU, transfering their 
seigniorage should not lead to a change in the inflation.
**
Fair contributions  In the euro area there is an allocation scheme for the monetary income 
that is independent of the inflation rates of the Member States. There 
can, however, be minor differences between contributions of Member 
States belonging to the euro area and the others, depending in particular 
on differences in inflation and interest rates. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that once the current "transitional regime" is over, i.e. as from 
2008, the Eurosystem's monetary income will be fully distributed to the 
NCBs (which are mostly owned by the Member States) according to 
the ECB capital key. This key is based equally on population and GDP. 
This could affect Member States' contributions to the EU budget, which 




Transferring seigniorage to the EU budget is in theory a fairly convenient and 
efficient way of financing the EU. It offers a number of practical advantages such 
as very limited compliance and administration costs. Furthermore, it scores well in 
terms of equity and fair contributions. 
Due to the relative lack of visibility of seigniorage, the impact of this transfer on 
accountability of EU budgets would be limited. This, however, is sometimes seen 
as an advantage at a political level, as it could facilitate the adoption of such 
proposal. Furthermore, the revenues would only cover a small part of the EU 
budget.
The main issue linked to seigniorage therefore seems a practical one. Due to 
differences in their revenues and costs structures, some central banks may incur 
deficits as a result of the introduction of the transfer of seigniorage. Depending on 
the size of the transfer and, notably, whether all seigniorage income or only a part 
of it would be transferred to the EU budget, this may create sustainability problems 
in the long term for which there could be no simple solution.
III.6. COMMUNICATION TAXATION
The idea to use taxation of communication services as a source of revenue for the EU 
budget was introduced by Begg et al. (1997). It has been analysed in detail by the 
European Parliament (1997). EU-wide communications tax bases could include road 
transport, air transport, telecommunications in all its forms and, possibly, 
broadcasting. However, “sea and rail transport can probably be dismissed as being 28
unevenly spread geographically, and having favourable environmental characteristics 
that [EU] governments want to encourage”.
Concretely, the European Parliament (1997) focuses on three possible 
communications taxes. For telecommunication services, the tax would be a fixed 
amount per telephone ‘line’. It is assumed here that this amount would be paid by 
consumers and raised at the operators’ level. The EU telecommunication tax would 
be clearly identified on the bills. The tax on road transport would be a vehicle tax 
harmonised at the EU level. Member States could set surcharges on the EU tax, or 
raise other vehicle taxes. For air transport, the assessment presented below assumes 
that a European air tax would be a per capita tax on travellers. It is assumed here that 
national tax administrations would manage these taxes. 
It should be noted that the creation of communications taxes would either require 
harmonising existing air travel and vehicle taxes or creating new taxes alongside 
Member States taxes. A telephony tax would have to be created in any case. This 
may not be easy.
More fundamentally, the justifications for the communications tax seem rather 
blurred. Although air travel and vehicles taxation can somehow be related to EU 
environmental objectives of limiting air pollution, it is not the case for a telephony 
tax. In the latter case, there are no clear externalities that would justify imposing a 
new tax. Furthermore, considering the objectives stated above, one may wonder 
whether the same objective could not be fulfilled more efficiently in a different 
manner. For instance, taxing vehicles is not a very efficient instrument for reducing 
polluting emissions related to road transport. In its Communication on taxation of 
passenger cars in the EU [COM(2002)431], the Commission actually recommends 
the gradual reduction and even abolition of registration taxes, to be replaced by 
annual road taxes and motor fuel taxes (see section III.3 above). In this proposal, the 
tax burden would remain the same but it would be related to the use of a car rather 
than its acquisition. In the same Communication, the Commission recommends that 
the taxation of new passenger cars be more directly related to their CO2 emissions. 
The same arguments apply when it comes to air transport, where taxation of 
emissions seems more efficient than a per capita tax on travellers (see section III.9 
below).
Criterion Assessment of the EU communication taxation  Rating
Sufficiency Previous studies have shown that revenues from this source will be 
adequate to finance only part of the EU budget. Begg et al. (1997) 
estimate that an airport departure tax of ECU 15 would yield around 
10% of the EU budget, while an annual average tax per telephone line 
of ECU 40 could finance another 10% of the budget. In the long run,  
"communication" services are expected to continue growing at a 
significant pace. This would improve revenue prospects for the 
communications tax. On the other hand, it may become increasingly 
difficult to raise a tax on telephone lines in a fast-changing 
technological environment. Overall, an EU communications tax would 
have to be complemented by other resources if it were to finance the 
EU budget.
*29
Stability In principle, there are important cyclical components in 
telecommunications and air and road transports sectors. However, the 
vehicle tax and the tax on telephone lines are unlikely to present 
significant short-run changes. In case of economic recession it is 
unlikely that people would sell their cars or cancel telephone lines. 
Business cycle effects would be felt at the margin on the growth rate of 
the tax. On the other hand, the air travel tax may be more sensitive to 
short-run economic shocks, as both companies and citizens tend to cut 
back on travel expenses in case of economic hardship.
**
Visibility The taxes on telecommunications, on road transport and on air transport 
would be very visible to many consumers. They would clearly appear 




Compliance costs would be moderate. On the one hand, the 
communications tax is a set of new taxes to be faced by consumers or 
economic operators. This will require new arrangements and may 
impose a burden on economic operators and tax administrations. On the 
other hand, revenues could be collected relatively easily through 
existing structures. The air travel tax and the telecommunications taxes 
could be collected via the economic operators (air and telephone 
companies). The scope for evasion and fraud would be rather limited. 
Vehicle taxes could be collected by national tax administrations in 





Although the Agenda 2000 indicated that this tax would be consistent 
with transport directives and with strengthening competitiveness 
through the trans-European network (TEN) initiatives, the analysis 
above leads to a different conclusion. As it is proposed, the 
communication tax would not tackle in an efficient way congestion or 
pollution problems and, in the case of a telephony tax, it seems difficult 
to justify it for efficiency reasons. 
*
Horizontal equity Provided an effective harmonisation of the different tax bases for the 
communications tax is achieved, there should not be discrimination 
between taxpayers.
***
Vertical equity  “The number of vehicles is linked to income while air travel tends to be 
greatest amongst the richer” (European Parliament, 1997). It seems 
likely that telecommunications services also increase with income. 
Overall, communication taxation would appear to be in line with 
vertical equity. 
***
Fair contributions  “Telecommunications revenues appear to be correlated with GNP” (EP, 
1997). Furthermore, “current statistics suggest that prima facie the 
incidence of air travel is somewhat uneven as between Member States, 
but the nature of air travel makes it difficult to interpret these data. A 
holiday (return) flight from Germany to Greece would show up as a 
departure from both Member States, but in both cases it would be 
German residents who paid the tax. Equally, major gateways such as 
Heathrow, Paris or Amsterdam will record departures by passengers 
who are from other Member States and often from outside the EU. 
Interpretation of air traffic figure could be problematic, although the 





A European communication tax, made up of different components could have some 
advantages. It would be visible and fare well in terms of equity.
On the other hand, practical considerations, such as the difficulty to introduce a set 
of new EU taxes, and serious budgetary limitations will play against such a tax. 
Furthermore, some of the stated objectives associated with a communication tax 
could be better fulfilled with other instruments or alternative EU tax candidates.
III.7. PERSONAL INCOME TAX
Personal taxes constitute one of the most direct and visible links between 
taxpayers/citizens and elected authorities. The attraction of an EU personal income 
tax partly rests on the opportunity to exploit this direct link in order to enhance 
accountability.
Three main options can be identified: 
− The first one would consist of setting a per capita tax on all EU citizens. The 
annual amount would be about €260 per person in the EU-15 (estimate on the 
basis of the EU budget in 2003). It would have the advantage of being 
extremely visible, simple and efficient. On the other hand, it would probably 
be unacceptable to many people for equity reasons. Considering unsuccessful 
past experiences, such as with the “poll tax” in the UK, this option is not 
further discussed here.
− A second option would consist in setting a surcharge on the Member States’ 
personal income tax. This surcharge would be a percentage of the national tax. 
This could have the advantage of maintaining the progressiveness of the 
personal income tax unchanged in the various Member States. However, as 
Member States’ systems are quite different, it is likely that simply setting an 
equal surcharge across the Member States would deliver quite unequitable
results, i.e. with regard to horizontal equity. This is why the surcharge would 
have to be fine-tuned in order to take national differences into account. A 
concrete proposal could be based on Biehl (1985, 1990 and 1992). There 
would be a two-stage procedure for deriving a progressive surcharge on 
income tax. In the first stage, an overall tax burden would be determined for 
each Member State, based on its per capita income or other relevant variables. 
A political decision would have to be taken on the degree of progressiveness 
of national contributions to the EU budget. In a second stage, the overall tax 
burden of each Member State would be transformed into a uniform percentage 
surcharge on national personal income tax payments. The surcharge would be 
shown on each tax declaration (and each national tax invoice) so that each 
taxpayer would know her contribution to finance EU expenditure. 
− A third option would be to create a separate EU personal income tax, with a 
specific progressiveness, rebates, etc. Citizens would then have to fill in two 
tax returns, one for the Member State and one for the EU. This situation would 
be similar to what happens for instance in Quebec (Canada), where citizens 31
pay separate taxes for the province and the federal government. However, the 
administrative and compliance costs in this case would be significant. In this 
scenario the tax base and the tax rates would be determined at EU level. This 
tax would be as simple as possible. This would presumably imply a broad 
base, in combination with low rates and no exemptions (other than a basic 
personal allowance). Thus, there would be no need to consider other aims of 
national systems that usually result in complex income tax systems. In view of 
the otherwise enormous administrative (and political) problems, a harmonised 
EU income tax would need to be managed by the tax authorities of the 
Member States. The tax law would be introduced via a Council Regulation for 
the core elements and Directives for the administrative elements. 
In order to simplify the presentation, the assessment below focuses on this last option. 
Where the assessment of the two options would differ significantly, an explicit 
mention of this difference is made in order to highlight their respective merits.
Criterion Assessment of the Harmonised EU Personal income tax  Rating
Sufficiency The EU personal income tax could yield sufficient revenues to finance 
completely the EU budget because the tax base is very broad. The 
personal income tax of Member States represent an estimated average 
of 10.1% of EU GDP in 2001 (European Commission, 2003). An EU 
tax equivalent to about 10% of the Member States’ tax would thus yield 
revenues of approximately 1% of EU GDP. 
***
Stability Personal income is correlated with the business cycle. The elasticity of 
tax revenues with respect to GDP is one on average for 20 OECD 
countries (OECD, 2000). In the EU, it is lowest in France (0.6) and 
highest in Greece (2.2). There is no reason to believe that an EU 
personal income tax would be less stable than Member States' taxes. 
Actually, being an EU wide tax it could be more stable than national 
PITs because some of the fluctuations observed in individual Member 
States could neutralize each other. 
***
Visibility The visibility of the tax would be particularly high, as would the link 
between the financing of the EU and the good management of 
resources made available to the budget. Accountability of the EU 




An own and separate EU personal income tax (third option described 
above) would clearly result in more significant operating cost than a 
surcharge on a national tax. Even when the tax would be set-up in an 
extremely simple and standardised form, the necessary tax law and 
other administrative provisions to be implemented, the administrative 
set-up and the possible co-ordination with national tax systems would 
imply significant administration cost. Compliance costs would be 
increased as well. Furthermore, ensuring that parts of the taxable 
income, which are not taxed in some Member States (like capital gains 
in Germany or Belgium) are efficiently and effectively included in the 
tax base in these Member States or are excluded in the others could 
lead to serious difficulties. Related to this problem is the question of 
incentives for Member States to properly assess and collect the EU tax 
for the Community. If it were completely independent from the national 
tax system, there would be a very limited interest for Member States to 
ensure a correct and complete taxation of all national income 
underlying this tax. 
It should be noted that these problems would not exist for the second 
option envisaged above. In a system of national surcharges, operating 
costs are almost inexistent, as is highlighted by local surcharges 






It is unlikely that a harmonised EU personal income taxation would 
have any significant impact on the allocation of the tax base, 
investments, or consumption. This is even more so as national taxes 
could be decreased as a consequence of the replacement of 
contributions to the EU by the EU tax. 
**
Horizontal equity Two equivalent taxpayers living in different Member States would have 
to pay the same tax.
This comes in sharp contrast with the second option where surcharges 
between Member States would be different to take into account 
variables such as the national average per capita income. 
***
*
Vertical equity  The harmonised European income tax could be progressive. The 
progression could notably result from a tax-free basic allowance. 
However, as it would probably be difficult to include a part of revenues 
accruing from capital, the income redistribution would mainly bear on 
labour income. 
**
Fair contributions  Being a tax on revenues, the harmonised EU personal income tax 
would probably allow collection of more receipts in richer countries. 
Variations linked to the share of labour vs. capital income in the GDP 
and the differences in wage distributions could be expected but they 





A harmonised European personal income tax would clearly enhance accountability 
of the EU. It could also give access to very wide budgetary resources, in a 
relatively equitable way.
Although the system would require some very difficult political discussions to 
determine a common approach for the tax base, the tax rates, the implementation of 
tax law and other provisions, and the functioning of the administration, it could 
prove a sensible way of financing the EU. 
The main disadvantage of this proposal would be the considerable administrative 
and compliance costs and the possible mismatches with the national income tax 
systems.
A comparison of the assessments of the harmonised EU personal income tax and a 
tax based on an EU surcharge on national personal income tax highlights two main 
differences. While the harmonised EU tax would involve much more compliance 
and administrative costs than the EU surcharge, it would also fare better in terms of 
horizontal equity.
III.8. TAX ON FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
Taxing financial transactions on the Stock Exchange Markets in the EU has been 
mentioned on several occasions. 
Concretely the tax could be raised on each transaction of shares and, possibly, bonds. 
The tax could be based on the value of the transactions, as is or was the case in 
various stock markets in the EU. The assumption used below is that the tax could be 
paid by market operators or, more simply, directly by stock market authorities.
Before assessing this tax, various remarks have to be made. It should first be 
reminded that the introduction of stamp duties or equivalent taxes can have a 
considerable impact on the localisation of financial markets. It seems for example that 
creating stamp duties on the New-York stock exchange contributed to the 
development of the Luxembourg Eurobond market. Therefore, in order to avoid a 
massive displacement of financial transactions to extra-EU markets, the rates to apply 
to transactions would have to be fairly limited. It should also be underlined that the 
proposal may be seen as a potential door opener for the Tobin tax, i.e. a currency 
transaction tax (see European Commission, 2002). This link may seriously influence 
and blur the debate on the issue. 
Criterion Assessment of tax on financial transactions  Rating
Sufficiency The tax could in theory bring substantial revenues. However, the exact 
amount is highly uncertain and would very much depend on the base 
and the rates used. It would also crucially depend on the reaction of 
market operators. In practice, considering the high mobility of the tax 
base it is likely that the rate of the tax would be very small. This would 
be in line with the experience in several Member States. 
*
Stability Stock markets activity is very unstable. It depends on many economic, 
technological and political factors. In addition, tax policies may directly 
affect the activity of stock markets. 
*34
Visibility The tax would be visible to investors and financial market operators. 
However, a large proportion of the EU citizens would not be really 




Compliance and administration costs could be fairly limited, since the 





If the tax is extremely small, it would be possible to avoid major 
disruptions in the capital markets in the EU. However, it is difficult to 
define how small the tax should be. Taxes on transactions of shares 
have been eliminated in Austria (2000), Italy (1998), the Netherlands 
(1990), Sweden (early 1990s) in order to facilitate the development of 
local stock markets, while in most other Member States, the rates are a 
fraction of one % of the value of sales. The sensitivity of financial 
markets to taxes is such that it has been estimated that an EU tax on the 
transaction of currencies of 0.10% in the EU might lead to a 83% fall in 
the volume of transactions (CSF 2001, p.50). In short, even in the case 
of a small tax, the impact of the tax on the location of capital 
investments may be substantial. 
*
Horizontal equity In principle, there would be a harmonised tax base. However, the 
diversity of financial instruments would presumably allow similar 
investors to face different tax burdens according to their investment 
strategies.
**
Vertical equity  The tax would affect holders of investments in shares (and possibly in 
other financial products). This is likely to bear mostly on richer people. 
***
Fair contributions  In theory, there is a positive correlation between investments in stocks, 
the development of capital markets and GDP. However, financial 
investments also very much depend on other factors not related to 
GDP. For instance, retirement policies and the existence of pension 
funds can largely affect the development of financial activities. 
Furthermore, considering the very high mobility of capital across 
borders and the increased integration of capital markets, it does not 
really make sense to identify capital with a specific country anymore. 
This regional arbitrariness would make it difficult to identify the 





A tax on financial transactions seems relatively straightforward to implement. It 
would also fare well on equity grounds. 
However, it has some major drawbacks. It is likely to disrupt the location of capital 
and financial investments in the EU. Should the tax be designed in order to avoid 
this problem, it would have to be so small that it would not bring sufficient 
revenues to the EU budget. Furthermore, these revenues would be subject to a 
significant instability and a large degree of uncertainty.
Lastly, taxing capital is a very sensitive issue at the political level. Discussions on 
this proposal could easily be mixed with other debates, such as the possibility of 
introducing a Tobin tax. 
III.9. CLIMATE CHARGE ON AVIATION
Aviation contributes to climate change, in particular through the emission of the 
greenhouse gas carbon dioxide (CO2), of nitrogen oxides (NOx) leading to ozone 35
formation and through the formation of “condensation trails” and cirrus clouds. The 
relative contribution from aviation to global warming is still modest – in 1992 it was 
about 3.5% - but it is expected to grow significantly in the future. From 1995 to 1999, 
CO2-emissions from air transport in the EU increased by an average rate of 5.2 % per 
year and was thus the fastest growing source of CO2 emissions. While various events 
including those of 11
th September 2001 have led to reduced growth in recent years, 
projections suggest that this phenomenon is purely temporary and that aviation will 
continue to grow rapidly in the future.
Taxation of aviation emissions is therefore sometimes advocated in order to 
internalise the climate change impact of aviation transport. In the 2001 White Paper 
on the Common Transport Policy [COM(2001)370], the Commission raised the issue 
of taxation of aircraft fuel, and stated that “[a]s an additional or alternative solution 
the Commission proposes, as part of the programme to create the single sky, to 
introduce differential en route air navigation charges to take account of the 
environmental impact of aircraft”. Furthermore, in the 6
th Environment Action 
Programme adopted by the Council and the European Parliament on 22 July 2002, the 
Community decided to identify and undertake “specific actions to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions from aviation if no such action is agreed within the International Civil 
Aviation Organization by 2002”.  It has since become clear that the ICAO will not be 
able to reach consensus on the global implementation of any effective economic 
instruments to this end in the foreseeable future. Therefore an aviation climate tax or 
charge could play a useful role in helping to achieve Community environmental 
objectives, while contributing to the financing of the Union. 
Apart from a straightforward fuel tax, several options can be considered for 
introducing an aviation emission charge or tax in the EU. Some of these are discussed 
in detail in Wit and Dings (2002). The main elements of a climate charge could be as 
follows:
− The aviation charge could bear on both CO2 and NOx. This would allow for a 
better incentive structure than options consisting in charging only one of these 
components. Indeed, for a given level of engine technology there may be a 
trade-off between CO2 and NOx emissions, as generally CO2 decreases and 
NOx increases with increasing engine pressure and temperature. Restricting 
the incentive base to CO2 alone may therefore bring with it the risk of sub-
optimal shifts towards high-NOx engines. 
− The system could combine ex ante and ex post calculation of charges. Ex ante
figures would be based on performance manuals and provide charges for 
specific aircraft on different distances along a standard flight cycle. These 
would permit not to over-charge a flight delayed by congestion, for instance. 
However, if they manage to operate their aircraft such that actual emissions 
are lower than the standard (ex ante) profile, operators could supply actual 
flight data from which to calculate emissions on an ex post basis. Such a 
design would give airlines incentives to fly low-emissions airplanes and to 
operate them as efficiently as possible.36
− Last, the charge could in theory be collected under the Route Charge System 
of Eurocontrol. However, this would require an agreement among all parties 
concerned. The emissions charge could be identified and accounted for 
separately from the current en route charge for air navigation services.
Criterion Assessment of the EU climate charge on aviation  Rating
Sufficiency Wit and Dings (2002) estimated the annual revenue arising from the 
aviation charge to amount to €1-9 billion, depending on the value 
attributed to each tonne of CO2 and NOx emitted. In a scenario of 
€30/tonne CO2-equivalent and €3.6/kg NOx-equivalent, the charge 
would bring €5.3 bn. This amount has to be compared with an EU 
budget of slightly less than €100bn in 2003. However, it is important to 
note that this study did not address the climate change beyond that of 
CO2 and NOx. Recent EU research [Tradeoff (2004)] suggests that the 
total climate change effect of aviation is in the range of 2-4 times 
higher than that of the CO2 emissions alone. In the longer run, traffic 
forecasts generally suggest that the dominance of demand growth rates 
over efficiency improvement rates will continue to prevail in the future. 
This in turn will result in continued growth in the potential tax base. 
*
Stability Air transport can be significantly influenced by major events such as 
the outbreak of wars or events like the ones of September 11, 2001. 
This makes this potential resource a particularly unstable one in the 
short run.
*
Visibility Already today, some airlines have adopted the practice of specifying 
the contribution of airport taxes to overall ticket prices. It is possible or 
even likely that airlines would adopt a similar practice if an EU wide 
climate charge were introduced. If not, such specification could be 
made mandatory or recommended practice. This would render the 
climate charge very visible to air transport passengers. However, 
citizens at large would not be made particularly aware of the 'cost of 




Wit and Dings (2002) conclude that the Eurocontrol infrastructure 
presently used to collect charges covering the costs of air traffic 
management (the “Eurocontrol Route Charge System”) could be 
extended and used to administer a climate charge as well. The 
possibility of using an existing system suggests that operating costs 





The costs relating to the climate change impacts of air transport are 
currently not reflected in the price seen by users of air transport. This 
means that the use of air transport and climate change mitigation 
technology and techniques is not optimal from a socio-economic point 
of view. Internalising the external costs would contribute to correcting 
the current market failure and lead to a more efficient allocation of 
resources and greater overall welfare. 
***
Horizontal equity  The climate charge would be applied in a uniform fashion all across the 
EU. Equal treatment would thus be applied to equivalent consumers. 
***
Vertical equity  While the price of air transport has generally decreased in recent years, 
air transport services are still used more frequently by high-income 
groups. Applying a climate change charge on aviation would thus be 
“progressive”.
***37
Fair contributions  Within a population, consumption of air transport services correlates 
strongly with income level. Not surprisingly, existing data also suggest 
a positive correlation with GDP. Furthermore, allocating the revenue 
from a climate change charge on aviation to the EU budget would be 
consistent with the international character of much air transport. The 
existence of a so-called "regional arbitrariness" in the allocation of 





The climate charge on aviation scores high on most criteria. However, this 
environmental charge would not bring sufficient or stable revenues to the EU 
budget. It should thus be a complement to other resources and would probably 
require having financial autonomy at EU level.
The main obstacle for the short term implementation of such a tax is reluctance at 
political level to employ instruments in the air transport sector that could have 
impacts on the demand or competitive position of EU carriers. The EU and its 
Member States would generally prefer a worldwide agreement to take action. This 
is however unlikely to materialise given the differences in political priorities and 
views on how to address climate change problems between different ICAO 
Contracting States. 
IV.   COMPARISON AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
In this section, the various possible EU taxes are compared with regard to each of the 
eight criteria. Table 1 below summarises the assessment made in the previous section. 
IV.1. BUDGETARY CRITERIA
The budgetary criteria are of critical importance in determining the appropriate new 
European own resource. The stability criterion is important with regard to the 
financial autonomy of the EU. Sufficiency indicates whether a given resource is 
sufficient to finance the whole budget.
(i)  Sufficiency 
Three of the possible EU taxes seem to offer prospects to fully cover the needs of 
the Community, including in the longer run prospect: the modulated VAT, the 
personal income tax and energy taxation. Several other resources could bring 
about substantial revenues but these would probably be insufficient to fully cover 
the EU needs.
In principle, this problem of revenue insufficiency can be overcome by 
combining several resources, including contributions from the Member States, to 
make up for the needs of the EU budget.38
(ii)  Stability 
Four of the nine possible EU taxes – the modulated VAT, energy taxation, 
personal income tax and excise duties on tobacco and alcohol – would satisfy the 
criterion of stability.
The other possibilities offer a moderate or limited stability in the short-run, in 
general due to their sometimes strong link to the business cycle. In the absence of 
financial autonomy, EU resources could therefore be too limited in years of slow 
economic growth and could tend to exceed the needs in times of prosperity. 
Developing a flexibility mechanism on the revenue side to complement tax 
autonomy could be necessary. This mechanism could consist in either allowing 
financial autonomy or variable transfers from the Member States to ensure a 
balanced budget.
Overall, in order to achieve stability, sufficiency and permitting and effective tax 
autonomy, it might therefore be appropriate to combine taxes with other resources, 
such as Member States contributions, and envisage a certain degree of financial 
autonomy.
IV.2. EFFICIENCY CRITERIA
The constraints related to the budgetary framework are of significant importance, as is 
illustrated above. Nevertheless, the assessment of the EU taxes must also rest on other 
arguments. In this respect, efficiency criteria are of critical importance.
(i)  Visibility 
Several of the assessed taxes would respect to a large extent the visibility 
criterion. This is in particular the case for the modulated VAT and the personal 
income tax. Only the transfer of seigniorage revenue and the tax on financial 
transactions would clearly lack visibility to the public at large.
(ii) Low operating costs 
In general, the operating costs would not create a major or insurmountable issue, 
except for one scenario of harmonised personal income tax. In some cases, the tax 
could lead to an actual improvement upon the current situation or to costs that 
could be negligible. This is for example the case for the transfer of seigniorage 
revenue or the corporate income tax.
In some cases, there can be a trade-off between low operating costs and high 
visibility. This has been illustrated for the proposal on EU excises on alcohol and 
tobacco. Increasing the visibility of the tax may impose a cost on the seller or the 
consumer.39
(iii) Efficient allocation of resources 
Corporate income tax, energy taxation and a climate charge on aviation could 
have an impact on, and help foster EU policies. This is due to the numerous 
cross-border externalities observed in the related areas. Furthermore, in the case 
of the transfer of seigniorage revenue, the tax could probably be raised in a fairly 
efficient, non-distortive way. 
In most other cases the tax should be seen as an instrument to raise revenues 
rather than as an instrument to achieve Community policies. However, in the case 
of the tax on financial transactions and the communication tax, the tax could 
prove detrimental to the proper allocation of capital and investment in the EU. 
IV.3. EQUITY CRITERIA
The economic assessment of the assignment of a tax to a given level of government 
also very much depends on equity issues.
(i)  Horizontal equity 
The horizontal equity primarily depends on the degree of harmonisation of the tax 
base. Where there is full harmonisation, horizontal equity is achieved, while in 
the other cases, one should expect equivalent EU citizens to be taxed in different 
ways.
It has been assumed in a number of cases that harmonisation would be achieved. 
Therefore, most taxes examined above accordingly respect to a high degree the 
criterion. However, it is far from obvious that actual harmonisation would be 
achieved in some cases. This is for instance illustrated by the failure to complete 
harmonisation for the VAT in the Community despite decades of efforts. The 
current degree of harmonisation offers limited indications on the level of 
harmonisation that could be reached in the future, e.g. for the personal income 
tax.
(ii) Vertical equity 
Vertical equity is also a major issue when it comes to designing a tax structure. In 
general, priority is given to a tax system that allows for some kind of inter-
personal redistribution.
In this respect, the communication taxation, the tax on financial transactions and 
the climate charge on aviation, which would be new EU taxes, would respect the 
criterion to a large extent. Indeed, these taxes would mainly be a burden on 
relatively wealthy people and the revenues raised would allow for a 
corresponding decline in Member States contributions and taxes. A number of 40
other taxes would also respect this criterion, albeit to a lower extent. Only excise 
duties on tobacco and alcohol would bear to a relatively large extent on poorer 
households, thereby possibly decreasing the overall progressiveness of taxation in 
the EU. 
(iii) Fair contributions 
The criterion would be respected to a large extent for the communication 
taxation, the personal income tax and the climate charge on aviation. The other 
taxes would in all likelihood not fully respect this criterion. This would in 
particular be the case for excise duties on alcohol or tobacco. This means that 
should these taxes be the main source of finance of the EU budget the revenue 
collected in some of the Member States would be relatively high considering their 
level of economic development compared to other Member States. This result is 
not surprising given the diversity characterising the economic and tax structures 
of the Member States.
It should be noted that a possible solution to unequal distributions of the tax base 
would be to set up some form of equalisation mechanism to adjust the Member 
States' contributions according to the amount of tax collected on their territory 
and other relevant variables. Equalisation mechanisms are found in numerous 
federal systems, as well as in decentralised States. They are inherent to State 
structure when there are differences in needs and resources across "regions". 
Setting an equalisation mechanism to replace or complement the current GNI 
contribution could thus be a useful complement to tax autonomy in the context of 
a reform of the current own resource system.
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
The assessment of a number of taxes according to the criteria presented in this study 
has to be considered a preliminary and partial analysis. A more refined examination 
would be required of the options considered above, notably with regard to their 
budgetary and distributional implications, in the case of a political decision to create 
an EU tax.
One of the main conclusions that can be drawn from this multi-criteria analysis is that 
there is no such thing as a perfect tax for the EU. All the main candidates for EU taxes 
that have been envisaged over the last few years have some pros and some cons. They 
perform well according to some criteria and less well according to others.
The inability of potential EU taxes to meet fully certain criteria should not lead to the 
conclusion that they should all be dismissed, as has sometimes been argued in the 
past. On the contrary, the analysis presented here highlights the fact that the choice 
between one or several EU taxes would critically depend on a political choice as to 
which criteria should be considered essential and which secondary.41
Furthermore, a discussion on the financing of the budget should not only consist of 
debating the merits of the various taxes according to the criteria presented above. It 
should also assess the new financing system that would result from the application of 
one (or several) taxes at EU level, compared with the existing system which is 
characterized by (mainly) direct transfers from the Member States. Whereas the 
current system offers the advantage of bringing stable and sufficient resources to the 
EU budget, in a way that respects horizontal equity, it also presents major drawbacks, 
such as a complete lack of visibility and limited links to EU policies. Whether this 
system should be preferred to an alternative system is also a matter of political 
priorities.
In short, there is no simple solution to a complex question. The technical arguments 
presented here can, at best, underline the costs and benefits of various options. But the 
EU financing system must ultimately be determined on a political basis, taking into 
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